Redesigning the Dragon Financial Reform in the Peoples Republic of China
Redesigning the Dragon Financial Reform in the Peoples Republic of China
Redesigning the Dragon
Financial Reform in the Peoples Republic of China
Duncan Marsh
dmarsh@indiana.edu
Anna Pawul apawul@indiana.edu
Dmitri Maslitchenko
dmitri@mailroom.com
V550, Government Finance
in the Transitional Economies
21 November, 1996
In 1978, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
embarked on the enormous undertaking of opening its doors to the outside world.
Until this point in time, the PRC had relied on a centralized economic system
much like that of the former Soviet Union[1].
However, the PRC’s situation differed with the former Soviet Union in three
substantial ways[2]
1) although reforms followed the Cultural Revolution (which did exact its toll
on the Chinese economy) there was an absence of severe macroeconomic crises
when reforms were begun 2) agricultural infrastructure was good, although the
incentives were poor and 3) China had a strong presence of overseas Chinese
and Hong Kong that influence its economic development and over the years
supplied capital and human resources.
The industrialization strategy adopted by the
PRC has been characterized by gradualism and experimentation. Its focus has
been to introduce market forces, reduce mandatory planning, decentralize, and
open the economy to foreign investment and trade[3].
This strategy had three main stages. The first (1979-1983) established four
“Special Economic Zones” (areas awarded special freedoms to conduct business
relatively free of the authorities intervention) in Guangdong and Fujian
provinces, the second (1984-1987) added 14 port cities creating the “Economic
Development Zones”, and finally the third stage (1988-present) which opened
most of the country to foreign trade and created “tariff free zones”[4].
In the rural areas, land reforms spearheaded further reforms and also the
establishment of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). These enterprises
were able to capitalize on the abundant cheap labor in rural areas and to
operate without the burden of providing social spending. They also provided a
training ground for the learning of market skills and concepts. Today,
production of manufactured goods by rural and township enterprise is estimated
to account for more than 40% of the GDP.
In many respects, China’s process of economic
reform has been highly successful.
Since its inception, the average GDP
growth has been a world-leading 9.3% year, the poverty rate has declined 60%,
and 170 million Chinese living in absolute poverty have seen their standard of
living raised above the minimum poverty level. Export growth was 7.8% in 1993,
29% in 1994 and 34.7% in 1995.[5]
Government measures to control inflation, which had threatened to overheat the
economy in the early 1990s, seem to have taken effect: inflation was under 15%
in 1995. (See Tables 1 and 2.)
Table 1.
Source: EIU Country Report, China/Mongolia, 3rd Quarter
1996. The Economist Intelligence Unit.
Table 2.
Source: EIU Country Report, China/Mongolia, 3rd Quarter
1996. The Economist Intelligence Unit.
Chinese economic reform has one other
characteristic that sets it apart from that of the former Soviet Union, the
absence of democratic reforms. The current transition is being carried out
within the “socialist framework” and for the most part is centrally
controlled. Much of the world waited to see whether the economic transition
would derail after the Tiananmen incident in 1989; it did not. However China
did seem to be looking for a way of separating itself from reforms and
democratic upheaval that were happening in the former Soviet Union[6].
In 1992, Deng Xiao Ping toured the southern economic zones - a journey
significant for its highly symbolic approval of the reform and investment
efforts he witnessed - and coined the phrase “socialist market economy”. Deng
emphasized that this transition must promote the development of productivity,
strengthen the national power and improve people’s standard of living, stating
that, “..with all these achievements secure, our socialist foundation is
greatly strengthened..”[7].
Within this backdrop, we will take a closer look
at the system of reforms currently underway in the People’s Republic of China.
This year marks the beginning of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000).
Examining the individual parts (the budget process, public expenditure, taxes,
banking, the interaction between central and provincial governments, and the
emerging need to transform the social safety net) will present a clearer
picture of what has been accomplished by the macroeconomic reforms put in place
in 1976 as well as what still needs to be done.
Revenue, Expenditure and the Budget
One problem of major proportion facing the
Chinese government is that central government revenues are growing at a much
slower rate than the overall economy, and a growing budget deficit has resulted
(see Table 3 in Appendix, page 20).[8]
This is especially debilitating in the face of increasing demands from the
surging economy for investment in infrastructure and with the need for
investment in a reformed social insurance system that will come with economic
disruptions caused by continuing liberalization. Expenditures have also been
falling as a percentage of GDP, but are growing faster than revenue.
Several factors have been identified in the
shrinking revenue-to-expenditures ratio problem:
Revenue
·
Tax arrears on
the industrial and commercial tax (CICT) from enterprises, which are growing as
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) become more unprofitable in the face of
increasing competition. At the end of 1994, these arrears amounted to 8.2
billion yuan (¥), and just seven months later, the figure had grown to
¥17.9 bn.[9]
·
Tax exemptions
granted by local governments to state-owned and private enterprises.
Expenditures
·
Subsidies to the
loss-making SOEs, in the form of loans or direct subsidies (see Table 4).
China’s 1995 budget deficit was around a mere 1.5% of GDP. If policy lending
by centrally controlled banks - most of which is, effectively, transfers to
SOEs which can never afford to pay back these loans - is taken into account, the
central government’s true deficit is 6% of GDP or higher.[10]
·
Price subsidies.
(Most of these were for urban food, and adjustments made in 1992 have reduced
this drain on the budget.)
·
Higher than
expected increases in expenditures (in 1995, these were 18% higher than planned
on the central level, with local government expenditures over 30% higher than
in 1994.)[11]
·
A drop of 10.7%
in customs revenue from 1994 to 1995.
·
Inflation-indexed
interest subsidies on bank deposits and treasury bonds, which have been kept
high by high inflation rates.
Table 4.
Source: Wong, Christine
P.W., Christopher Heady, and Wing T. Woo. Fiscal Management and Economic
Reform in the People’s Republic of China. Oxford University Press. Hong
Kong: 1995.
For a country controlled by a Communist party,
the government’s proportion of economic activity has been remarkably small,
even before implementation of reform. In 1995, official government spending
was just 11.6% of GDP. Off-the-books revenue raising schemes by local governments
may mean the state’s total revenue is two times the official level.
The extra-budgetary revenue investment was
dispersed, uncoordinated and did not fulfill the central government’s
investment priorities. The central government faced growing infrastructure
demands, but with shrinking (in proportionate terms) assets available, has been
forced to reduce capital construction spending substantially. Also,
expenditures on administration, culture, education, and welfare increased over
the reform period, and reduced the government’s ability to spend on
infrastructure.[12]
(See Table 5 in Appendix, page 22.) The increases in administration spending
are particularly troubling, because of government policies to reduce control of
the economy and shrink some government bureaus.
One of the stated goals of the Ninth Five-Year
Plan is to eliminate the budget deficit by year 2000. But this goal is highly
unlikely to be achieved due to other conflicting goals, like spurring
employment, which may mean increasing subsidies to unprofitable SOEs; reducing
regional income disparities; and strengthening agriculture, which is seen as a
key to controlling inflation.
Christine Wong, an expert on the Chinese
financial system, identifies three necessary changes to restore the health of
the budget: First, the tax administration must be strengthened. Second, the
tax structure must be reformed so that it is neutral across products and
sectors. Third, the revenue-sharing system between local, provincial and
national levels of government must be revamped, with clearer tax assignments in
line with each levels set of responsibilities. The central government’s
control over the tax system and share of total revenues will likely have to be
increased. The next two sections will address these proposed changes.[13]
Taxation
The Pre-Reform Tax System
Prior to economic reforms, China’s tax structure
was based on the Soviet model. Enterprises remitted their profit to the
government, retaining only what was necessary to pay expenses. Revenues were
collected by local governments, and a certain amount was filtered up to the
central government. In 1984, this was replaced by a system of enterprise
income taxation reform, in which companies were taxed on their profits, as the
government tried to respond to economic imbalances created by the emerging
private sector. The turnover tax (the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial
Tax, or CICT), which had been the largest contributor to the government’s
annual revenue, was replaced with a business tax, a product tax, and a
value-added tax (VAT). These featured highly differentiated tax rates across
sectors, types of good and service, and form of firm ownership. Most private
firms paid a base tax rate of 33%, while most state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
were nominally taxed at 55%.[14]
In practice, however, taxes paid were governed by a contract responsibility
system (CRS), in which enterprises negotiated individually with local
government units. This system created conflict of interest because often the
local government was both tax collector and enterprise owner. Not only were
there differentiated rates which distort economic activity, there was little
incentive for full tax remittance back to the central government under this
system. (See Table 6 in Appendix, page 23, for a description of the tax
structure from 1985-1991.)
1994 Reforms
In 1994, the Chinese government began to respond
to these problems by enacting a series of reforms. The CICT was abolished and
the following taxes were created or modified:
Enterprise Income Tax. This unified corporation tax taxes companies at a
single 33% rate. Foreign enterprises and joint ventures are still enjoying
lighter tax burdens, because of the fierce competition between regions to
attract foreign investment, but these privileges are to be gradually
eliminated.
Personal Income Tax. Operates on a sliding scale, with a maximum of 45%. Not yet
comprehensively-implemented.
Value-Added Tax (VAT). Replaces the product tax of the CICT. Most goods
taxed at 17%, but agricultural and food products will be taxed at 13%, and
small-scale businesses will pay flat rate of 6%.
Consumption (Excise). Focuses narrowly on “luxury goods:” tobacco, alcohol,
gasoline, and a few others.
Business tax for services. Service industries will face a business tax of 3% to
20% on sales in place of the VAT. This tax also will apply to transfer of
intangible assets and the sale of real estate.[15]
Capital Gains. A capital gains tax was to be introduced in 1994, but its
implementation was postponed because of concern over its adverse impact on
China’s fledgling stock markets.
1996 Reforms
In 1996, China announced plans to reduce its
import tariff rate from 35.9% to 23%, while abolishing preferences for certain
goods and, importantly, eliminating exemptions from import tariffs (currently,
over 80% of imports are exempt from import duties for various reasons). [16]
This step alone should help to reduce the recent losses in customs revenue. The
Ninth Five-Year Plan also includes provisions to introduce taxes on interest
earnings and inheritances, policies designed to reduce income disparity.
Revision of Tax Collection Structure
In order to make the above tax policy changes
effective, the tax collection system must be revamped and greatly improved.
The current structure is based on a system of revenue contracts between
enterprise and government unit, and between local and central governments. One
of the necessary reforms involves tax exemptions, which local governments often
have the authority to grant to enterprises who for one reason or another are
unable to pay their taxes. This is a fundamental weakness in the Chinese
fiscal system: local government has decision-making authority to grant
exemptions on a tax the proceeds of which may in large part be assigned to
governments above. Numerous conflicts of interest can appear to reduce
incentives to enforce the tax at the local level.[17]
To address these changes, China in 1994 initiated
the setting up of a centrally-managed National Tax Service. This would replace
the contract system with a national “tax system,” based on uniform rules of tax
assignment and tax sharing. Certain assignments will be assigned to local
governments, and others to central government; others will be shared according
to predetermined formulas. Interestingly, in 1995, a special police unit was
set up to protect tax collectors under this new program.[18]
A potential obstacle to tax reform comes from
local governments. Local governments have traditionally supported reforms.
But this is because the reforms have usually given them greater autonomy. The
tax system reforms need to restore some control over investment and spending
back to the central government, which could encounter local opposition.
Allowing local governments some discretion over local tax rates can give them
some of the autonomy they desire, and provide greater incentive for
intergovernmental cooperation.
Few reports exist at present on the
implementation of these reforms. Certainly, the spirit and scope of the reforms
has been well-received by analysts, though more changes are advocated. But it
will take several more years to determine the success of the reform of tax
collection structures at the local level.
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationships
A product of economic reforms in transitional
economies is often a shift in intergovernmental fiscal relationships. In the
transition from centralized economy to market economy it is often from a
relationship where the local or provincial government is the receiver of the “plan”
to the local or provincial government proceeds with a greater autonomy. The
evolution of this relationship in the PRC has been very similar. However, the
provincial or local governments were at an advantage over many other
transitional economies because the Chinese system had the following
characteristics 1)local implementation capacity was already established in the
rural areas 2)China in most areas has a high ethnic homogeneity and 3) there
was much to gain by inter-province trading[19]
The very nature of Chinese economic
reforms, gradual and incremental, allowed “scaffolding” of behavior. Partial
reforms provided the environment to learn behaviors that could then be applied
to the next level of reform. Chinese economic reform was also structured on the
idea of decentralization. The establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
encouraged the local areas to develop their own strategies to attract business
and allowed them the freedom to implement the strategies. The very earliest
reforms, breaking up of farm communes, were also carried out at the local
level.
Many of the SEZs are doing very well
and people living in these areas are enjoying a higher standard of living than
they had previously enjoyed. However, tax collection still remains a difficult
endeavor with compliance at only 70%. In order to improve the poorest areas in
China, policies and programs that are able to move this revenue to the poorer
areas will be needed. This can take the form of a better accounting system to
ensure that all taxes due the central government for infrastructure development
actually arrive there.
Banking Reforms, State Owned Enterprises and the Social
Safety Net
In order to put current economic reforms in
perspective, understand the recommendations made by the international economic
community, and fully address the quagmire of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), a
more in depth look at the interconnectedness of the SOEs and the banking system
must be taken. We will attempt to do just that using the context of bank development
in the PRC, monetary policy, and ongoing reforms to SOEs.
Reform of the banking system in the
PRC has taken on similar characteristics to reform in other areas: i.e.,
gradual and experimental. At the beginning of reforms the financial sector in
the PRC could hardly be called a financial sector[20].
Financial sector development and implementation is a complex undertaking which
should include the development of institutions, instruments and markets[21].
Currently in the PRC, banking reform lags behind other areas of reform[22].
This is due to a complex array of policy decisions. No discussion of banking
reform in the PRC would be complete without an examination of the current state
of SOEs restructuring. Many macroeconomic initiatives are being put on hold in
order to bolster a failing state sector and postpone the social upheavals that
may be associated with the needed reforms of this sector.
Background
The Central Bank was established in
1984. In 1987 two additional universal banks were formed and non-bank
financial institutions were started. In 1988 new capital markets were formed
and the secondary trade of government bonds was allowed. In 1990 the Shanghai
and Shenzhen stock exchanges were opened. In 1992 all treasury bonds were
issued through underwriters[23].
At the end of 1994, the PRC had a total of 13 banks (of which 3 were
specialized banks and 3 were comprehensive banks). The new “financial system”
contained 20 insurance companies, 391 trust and investment companies and
greater than 60,000 credit cooperatives that operate in local areas[24].
During the summer of 1995 the central
government announced a series of new banking laws would be established. These
laws were the People’s Bank of China Law, the Commercial Banking Law, the
Negotiable Instruments Law and the Guarantee Law. Up until this time the roles
of each party in the framework of financial transaction hadn’t been clearly
defined. These laws begin to lay the comprehensive groundwork for financial
transactions[25].
The People’s Bank of China Law which was established in the summer of 1995
addresses the internal organization of the People’s Bank of China, its monetary
policy, its supervision and tries to establish its autonomy from provincial
and local governments (it is still under the control of the State Council).
This law has provisions in it for setting the prime lending rate, rediscount
window, amount of funds to be lent to commercial banks, and the trade of
treasury bonds, government securities and foreign exchange. It also bars the
People’s Bank of China from financing the budget deficits of the central
government and local governments. The Commercial Banking Law addresses the
mission of commercial banks. These are still under the guidance of the State
Council and still must issue policy loans (although the law also states that
any losses due to defaults on these loans will be compensated by the State
Council).
The Negotiable Instruments Law is
similar to the United States’ Uniform Commercial Code. The Guarantee Law deals
with mortgages, pledges, and liens. Both of these laws are hoped to standardize
and regulate credit transactions in the PRC[26].
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy in the PRC is
currently administered through a central “credit plan”. This plan, which is
administered by the State Council, sets credit quotas for each bank and also
facilitates direct bank financing of enterprises. In the current system the
major objectives of the specialized banks is to provide loans for various
projects, agriculture and foreign trade. The main recipients of these loans
are the state owned enterprises (SOEs). The terms and rates of these loans are
very favorable (usually 12%[27]).
Therefore the demand for these loans is higher than the supply and private
companies have to rely on other sources. This can take on various means and can
often lead to underground lending operations.
The convertibility of RMB has also been
undergoing changes. Prior to January 1, 1994, there were two money systems in
China. One for local use, the other for foreigners. These Foreign Exchange
Certificates (FEC’s) were redeemable only in state operated stores and
restaurants. Only higher level officials were able to use these and most
imported goods required the use of FEC’s. Since doing away with FEC’s , RMB
convertibility was relegated to official “swap shops”[28].
Now, with the correct permit businesses can use any large bank to exchange
money. However, the government has also begun to establish hard currency audits
as well as trying to force businesses to use the same bank for all of their
transactions (a way of tracking how much money is being exchanged). The new
convertibility does meet IMF requirements[29].
State Owned Enterprises and the Social Safety Net
As illustrated above, the banking system and
state owned enterprises are closely linked (see Table 7 in Appendix, page 24,
for financing of SOEs). According to Chinese government statistics, up to 20%
of the debt of state banks is bad debt. International estimates place this
figure at almost double that amount[30].
Recently in Jiangsu province, 30 SOEs declared bankruptcy telling the banks
they were not going to pay their debts. If all the banks in China did this it
would lead to bankruptcy of the banks[31].
SOEs account for only 34% of industrial output but consume 73.5% of government
investment[32].
Most have an average debt equal to 75% of total assets[33].
According to an Oxford Analytica study, in the first eight months of 1995, SOE
industrial output expanded by only 8.3% compared with a 13.7% increase for all
industry. And according to estimates, non-SOEs, on average, required less than
a third as much investment to achieve equivalent industrial output.[34]
These are serious problems. The ninth five year
economic plan (1996-2000) places priority on their eradication, calling for
SOEs to lay off workers to boost efficiency, and encouraging SOEs to “declare
bankruptcy if their liabilities outstrip assets, if they make long-term losses
and if they lose out in market competition.”[35]
Up until now current reforms and lessening of government controls have not only
not reigned in this problem but have also created new ones such as asset
stripping of the SOE by management, workers and local governments[36].
However, the central and local governments are
still hesitant to shut down even the most inefficient SOE. Currently, 7 out of
10 industrial workers work in a SOE. The SOE provides not only a job but
housing, education, pensions, insurance and often energy sources and commodity
shops on site. The World Bank estimates that only 56% of total expenditure by
SOEs is actually on wages, the rest is on “social spending”[37].
Therefore, any reform involving the SOEs must also involve reform and
development of a social safety net. Pilot programs have been started where
local governments create pension pools and are putting aside payroll taxes for
education, health and unemployment benefits. It is also important to note that
the question of “social security” reform is being worsened by additional
factors. Population in the PRC is progressively growing older. This phenomenon
can be attributed to increase in life expectancy due to better living
conditions and the one child per family policy.
How Should Reforms be Implemented?
Due to the interconnectedness of these areas of
society, many of these reforms need to be implemented simultaneously. In May of
this year the World Bank published a Country Study[38]
that attempts to address these issues. The following are proposed reforms from
this study.
1) Reduce the role of government in the
directing of resources.
This over time would lesson the State Councils
role in directing the day to day functions of the banks and eventually do away
with the credit plan. Banks would be able to allocate resources appropriately
and to set their own interest rates.
2) Improve the Central Bank’s management
of monetary aggregates.
This over time would improve the consistency of
banking laws by ensuring that they are used and would also remove policy
lending from the banks and put it into the budget where it should be. This
would also allow for the development of the Central Bank as an institution.
3) Transform state commercial banks into
real commercial banks.
This step would help to free the banks from the
current crises of bad debt and allow them to loan money to the newly emerging
private sector.
4) Improve governance, diversify ownership and lower
subsidies for SOEs.
In the short term this would include implementing
an accounting system and independent audits, give autonomy to the managers,
getting rid of unviable businesses and restructuring those SOEs that can be.
5) Transfer social services to the
government.
This would reduce the burden on newly
restructured enterprises. Over time this would allow for a national system to
be implemented.
Conclusions
In comparison with other countries undergoing
transition from centrally-planned economic systems, China had the luxury of
initiating its reforms at a time when it faced no macroeconomic or serious
political crisis. It was able to adopt a two-track approach to economic
reform: China continued state control of existing enterprises while loosening
economic controls enough to permit growth of a new, nonstate sector. This was
possible in part because the inefficient state sector was a small share of the
economy, compared to most socialist nations.
China’s reform experience thus far has been one
of “enabling” reform, allowing “marketization” instead of forcing
“privatization,” getting government to “step out of the way” of the flows of
commerce. The results have been good to excellent in the productive sectors,
but the reform has not yet succeeded in the fiscal and monetary sectors, which
are the domains of government. Here the government can’t step out of the way;
it must build the proper tools and structures to manage these sectors.[39]
It is in these areas, and in the efforts to reduce administration, dismantle
SOEs, and provide an adequate social insurance system for displaced workers and
affected citizens that China faces its true reform challenges.
To further evaluate how far China has come down
the path of economic transition, we look to a definition of transition used by
the World Bank, which describes these three components:
·
Liberalization:
freeing prices, trade and entry to markets from state controls, while
stabilizing the economy. Stabilization is an essential component to
liberalization.
·
Clarifying
property rights and privatizing them where necessary. Requires re-creating the
institutions that support market exchange and shape ownership, and especially
the rule of law.
·
Reshaping social
services and the social safety net to ease the pain of transition while
propelling the reform process forward.
Examination of the Chinese experience shows that
liberalization has taken place to some degree, though much reform of prices,
trade and markets is still to be done. However, privatization and the
assignment of property rights are still very undeveloped, and the most
difficult parts of transition ahead are dependent on a still-unachieved
transfer of the social safety net from enterprise-based to government control.[40]
Were China to continue to grow at the rates of
the last two decades, it would surpass the United States as the world’s largest
economy in less than twenty years. Though some tapering off in the growth rate
is expected, China, with its sheer size and dynamism, is emerging as one of the
world’s economic powers. The reform policy choices it makes during this period
of transition thus have not only domestic but international significance, as
China’s domestic economic and social stability will be felt internationally.
The rest of the world has ample reason for assisting China in seeing these
reforms through peacefully. Opening of economic activity within China and with
the rest of the world will assist the process of political liberalization
within the country, and will provide enhanced regional and global security.
Table 3. The Fiscal Situation in the Reform Period
Source: Wong, Christine P.W., Christopher Heady, and
Wing T. Woo. Fiscal Management and Economic Reform in the People’s Republic
of China. Oxford University Press. Hong Kong: 1995, p.24.
Table 5. Government
Budgetary Expenditures
Source:
Wong, Christine P.W., Christopher Heady, and Wing T. Woo. Fiscal Management
and Economic Reform in the People’s Republic of China. Oxford University
Press. Hong Kong: 1995, p.24.
Table 6. Composition of
Tax Revenues
Source: Wong, Christine P.W., Christopher Heady, and
Wing T. Woo. Fiscal Management and Economic Reform in the People’s Republic
of China. Oxford University Press. Hong Kong: 1995, p.24.
Table 7. Changing Role of
the State
Source: Harrold, Peter. China’s Reform Experience
to Date. World Bank Discussion Papers #180. The World Bank:Washington, DC.
1992.
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